31 March 1959

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
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# CENTRAL

## INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



## TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03156030



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

31 March 1959

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## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

\*USSR: At about 1753 hours EST on 30 March a probably unsuccessful Soviet ICBM was launched on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. Countdown operations proceeded smoothly to zero time, and the missile apparently functioned normally for at least several minutes after launch. However, negative information from US collection facilities covering the terminal end of the range, as well as negative Soviet post-firing reports from that area, indicates that the missile failed to cover the full 3,500 nautical miles. The cause of the probable failure is undetermined.

\*USSR: Moscow's prompt replies to the Western notes of 26 March reflect Khrushchev's belief that the West is substantially committed to holding a summit meeting regardless of the outcome of a preliminary foreign ministers' conference. The Soviet notes seek to create the impression that the three Western powers and the USSR have already agreed to both a foreign ministers' conference and a summit meeting. Khrushchev's apparent desire not to obstruct the convening of a ministerial conference by insisting on the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia at the outset is evident in Moscow's willingness to have this question decided by the conference itself. While the Soviet notes indicate agreement to Western proposals on the date, place, and agenda of a conference of foreign ministers, the reference to the Soviet note of 2 March suggests that the USSR will insist that substantive discussions be confined to a German peace treaty and the Berlin question.

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*India Tibet: Prime Minister Nehru in his statement on Tibet before an aroused Parliament on 30 March appeared to balance his expression of sympathy for the rebels with a reaffirmation of India's desire for friendly relations with Communist China. Nehru sharply rejected Peiping's charges that Indian parliamentary discussions of the Tibetan situation were "impolite" and that the revolt was directed from Indian territory. Indian political groups and many newspapers are intensifying their pressure on the government to take an unequivocal stand against Chinese repression in Tibet. Tibetan resistance leaders based in India on 28 March apparently were planning an immediate appeal to Nehru for recognition of af Tibetan Provisional Government," for asylum for refugees, and for diplomatic and material assistance to the rebel movement. The Dalai Lama's party was expected to reach the Indian border on 31 March. (**Page 1**)

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Japan: The decision of the Tokyo district court to acquit seven Japanese nationals of trespassing on an American air base and its opinion that the presence of foreign troops in Japan is unconstitutional may make it more difficult for Kishi to effect an early revision of the US-Japanese security treaty. The opposition Socialists almost certainly will exploit it in their nationwide campaign against revision of the treaty, and this could lead to renewed incidents at US bases. The Japanese Government intends to appeal the decision, which in the interim will have no practical effect on the status of US forces in Japan.

(Page 2)

Iraq-UAR: Shammar tribesmen in northern Syria, armed with rifles and machine guns, are harassing Iraqi border posts. Iraqi members of the tribe who joined their fellow tribesmen in Syria during the Mosul revolt are being armed and encouraged by the UAR. Although sporadic attacks can be expected to continue, the Shammar tribes are not a major security threat and Baghdad is taking measures to strengthen its security forces in the area. (Page 3)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Greece: EDA, the Communist-front party, apparently has reached agreement on at least limited cooperation in the 5 April nationwide municipal elections with Sophocles Venizelos, leader of the largest faction of the non-Communist Liberal party. In the last general elections EDA polled nearly 25 percent of the total vote and attracted a plurality in some large urban areas. It stands to gain both political influence and greater respectability through cooperation with the Venizelos wing of the Liberals. (Page 4)

Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios, who previously has sought to promote a modus vivendi between right- and left-wing Greek Cypriots through a tacit understanding with the Communists, now has agreed to support moves to weaken the Communist-dominated labor federation on Cyprus. A period of labor unrest, may result and could lead to an end of the political truce within the Greek Cypriot community. (Page 5)

## III. THE WEST

France: Paris believes the West should try to put the USSR on the defensive by following up De Gaulle's public suggestion for a joint aid program attacking basic human problems in underdeveloped countries. The French Government may soon propose that a number of Western nations develop a program for Africa as a whole analogous to De Gaulle's plan for Algeriance conomic development.

(Page 6)

Panama: There are continuing reports of opposition preparations for invasions of Panama by mercenaries from Cuba and Costa Rica in conjunction with a coup in the capital. This complex scheme, which might be attempted as early as mid-April, is unlikely to succeed. However, such reports are indicative of the bitter rivalries within Panama's corrupt ruling oligarchy. Continued agitation could spark serious popular violence.

(Page 7) (Map)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Argentina: In calling a general strike for 3 April, the Peronistas and Communists are renewing strong pressure on President Frondizi to lift the state of siege and take steps which would enable them to regain control of a large segment of organized labor. Although politically motivated, the strike call may find considerable support because of widespread discontent over high living costs and require firm police and military control measures. (Page 8)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC (No Back-up Material)

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

## Indian Reaction to Tibetan Situation

The Indian Government apparently is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its official position of friendship toward Communist China in the face of increasing pressure from political groups and many newspapers to take a less equivocal stand on the Tibetan situation.

Prime Minister Nehru, in his statement before a tense Parliament on 30 March, adhered to his established policy of non-interference. His expression of sympathy for the Tibetan rebels was balanced by a reaffirmation of India's desire for friendly relations with Peiping. However, in sharply rejecting the Chinese allegation that discussion of Tibet in the Indian Parliament was "impolite," Nehru made it clear that he would countenance no limitations on parliamentary debate "by any external or internal authority."

Several non-Communist opposition parties now are actively agitating along anti-Chinese lines as expressed in much of the press during the past week, thus intensifying pressure on the government to condemn Peiping for its suppression of the resistance movement. Despite demands even among progovernment newspapers for a "realistic reassessment of the basis of our foreign policy," however, New Delhi is unlikely to deviate markedly from its policy of outward conciliation with Peiping. Nehru apparently is willing, as on past occasions, to let the press and opposition elements express the stronger and more representative views which he feels his government cannot officially endorse.

The Dalai Lama's party was expected to reach the Indian border on 31 March, probably en route to the large lamasery at Tawang in Assam--the first center inside Indian territory on the route from Tibet. Tibetan resistance leaders based in India on 28 March apparently were planning an immediate appeal to Nehru for recognition of a "Tibetan Provisional Government," for asylum for the Dalai Lama and other refugees, and for diplomatic and material assistance to the rebel movement. While New Delhi reportedly is ready to extend political asylum to the Dalai Lama and some refugees, it may try to ease the diplomatic problem posed by their presence by restricting Tibetan activities to nonpolitical affairs and limiting its overt support of the resistance movement.

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## Japanese Court Declares Presence of US Troops in Japan Unconstitutional

The Tokyo district court's opinion that the presence of foreign troops in Japan is unconstitutional may make it more difficult for Prime Minister Kishi to effect an early revision of the US-Japanese security treaty. Since the government plans to appeal the decision it will have no immediate effect on the legal status of US forces in Japan. It could, however, involve the Kishi government in an undesirable political controversy prior to the parliamentary elections in early June. It also gives added impetus to a nationwide Socialist campaign against revision of the security treaty.

In its action, the district court acquitted seven Japanese nationals accused of trespassing on an American air base in 1957. There is the possibility that incidents similar to that for which the seven were arrested—i.e., breaking down the fence surrounding Tachikawa air base in protest against its expansion—may be repeated. Left-wing labor and student groups, with Socialist encouragement, would be particularly prone to such action.

In declaring the presence of foreign troops unconstitutional, the district court cited article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the maintenance of an "army, navy, air force, and other war potential." The Japanese Government, in maintaining a limited military establishment, has interpreted this provision most liberally on the premise that every country has the inherent right to provide for its own defense, but it has avoided a legal test on this point. The court's decision could lead to additional juridical action on the entire question of military forces in Japan. A Foreign Ministry official has indicated that the government will appeal the decision.

## <del>- CONFIDENTIAL</del>

## Iraqi-UAR Relations

Acute strains persist in Iraqi-UAR relations, with Shammar tribesmen from northeast Syria harassing Iraqi border posts. The UAR is arming and encouraging members of the tribe who fled from Iraq to Syria during the Mosul revolt, and further sporadic attacks are to be expected. The military potential of the tribes is limited to scattered harassment, and Iraqi security forces have strengthened their position against infiltration from Syria. Baghdad radio has broadcast an appeal to other tribes in the Syrian border area, urging them not to join with the Shammar. There is no firm evidence of significant UAR troop movements into eastern Syria, but overflights of Iraq by UAR MIG fighters are continuing. Moreover, Syrian Army units on 30 March fired at two Iraqi aircraft just over the border on the Syrian side.

The former Iraqi ambassador to the UAR, Faiq Samarrai, quit his post late last week, charging that "Communists now rule Iraq"; Baghdad has "expelled" Samarrai from its diplomatic service, and said that he should have appeared before a people's court to testify about the "dirty mutiny in which UAR authorities had a hand." The Iraqi Government has not announced any plans to participate in the meeting of Arab League foreign ministers, now scheduled for 2 April in Beirut; the league's secretary general has stated the dispute will not be discussed unless both Iraq and the UAR attend.

personnel. sion eight of General of S as a result ed in the ex- "evidence";	and arrests continue among Iraqi government and army The Foreign Ministry has announced a decision to penits diplomatic officials and to dismiss others. Director ecurity Abd al-Majid Jalil reportedly has been replaced of Communist demands. The military trial which result ecution of four Iraqi Air Force officers brought forth stifying the arrest of a number of key anti-Communist rs, most of whom had already been relieved of their

Greek	Elect	tions
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The United Democratic Left (EDA), legal front for the proscribed Communist party of Greece, is trying to make the municipal elections scheduled for 5 April a test of the pro-Western government's popularity.

EDA leaders are seeking collaboration of non-Communist opposition parties in sponsoring joint slates of candidates for the municipal councils. While EDA has been rebuffed by spokesmen for several minor nationalist opposition parties, it apparently has achieved some success with Liberal leader Sophocles Venizelos. Venizelos, whose hatred of the government combined with his political opportunism make him a likely collaborator with the Communists, apparently has agreed to cooperate secretly with EDA in several municipalities. This cooperation, even if not effective in the council elections, may become evident in the subsequent election of mayors by the councilors.

Venizelos, however, is spokesman for only one faction of the rapidly deteriorating Liberal party. Several prominent Liberals have denounced collaboration with EDA and are working with other nationalist leaders to defeat the Communists. This grouping may hold the balance of power in some cities if the elections result in approximately equal distribution of council seats between EDA and the government.

The government favors holding "nonpolitical" elections, --emphasizing candidates rather than parties--apparently for fear that EDA, which captured 25 percent of the popular vote in the general elections in May 1958, has continued to gain strength among the electorate. EDA will probably gain new respectability from its association with the Venizelos wing of the Liberals. It will take credit for the victories of several non-Communist candidates and will probably increase its representation in local governments throughout Greece.

**SECRET** 

## Labor Contest May Disrupt Political Truce on Cyprus

Leaders of the conservative Cyprus Confederation of Workers (SEK) assert that Archbishop Makarios has agreed to support their efforts to increase their membership at the expense of the Pan Cyprian Federation of Labor (PEO), the island's largest union and a bulwark of Communist strength. Apparently Makarios is counting on the Communists' desire for legislative representation to keep them from breaking the political truce among Greek Cypriots in retaliation against attacks on PEO. Recently it was reported that in return for PEO leader Andreas Ziartides' agreement not to contest elections for an independent Cyprus, Makarios promised the Communists a guaranteed proportion--possibly as much as 25 percent--of the seats assigned to the Greek Cypriots.

Now at the zenith of their prestige, the conservative Greek Cypriots are anxious to disorganize and weaken the Communists and leftists, who stand to gain in strength as the new government grapples with the political and economic problems of an independent Cyprus.

District leaders of the recently disbanded and disarmed
OKA paramilitary organization are being brought into the now-
neffectual SEK, and an official of the International Confederation
f Free Trade Unions will give them a six-week course in labor-
nion methods. While regional leaders are sorely needed, the
anger exists that these former EOKA leaders will resort to
trong-arm tactics and disrupt the present favorable security
ituation on Cyprus.

- SECRET

### III. THE WEST

## De Gaulle Wants Broad Cooperation to Aid Undeveloped Countries

France may soon follow up De Gaulle's press statement of 25 March that he would welcome a summit discussion aimed at attacking the basic human problems of disease, hunger, and shelter. Premier Debré told Ambassador Houghton on 26 March that De Gaulle believes it important to introduce into the summit talks a topic broader than Berlin which would appeal to the peoples of the West and would put the USSR on the defensive.


De Gaulle has long felt that sooner or later the USSR would be obliged to cooperate with the West against the upsurge of nationalism among non-European peoples, particularly the Chinese. A recent article by Chief of Staff General Paul Ely in the French National Defense Review developed the idea that in another generation an "Americanized" Russia would need help to stave off Chinese expansion westward.

Debré tends to look on De Gaulle's plan for the economic development of Algeria as a prototype for undeveloped areas elsewhere. He feels that a great psychological advance has already been achieved by the plan, although its economic goals are long-range.)

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for Africa as	a whole.		

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## Panamanian Opposition Plots Invasion

A complex scheme for ousting the De la Guardia regime in Panama includes an invasion on the Pacific coast near the city of David by mercenaries from Costa Rica and a simultaneous landing on the Caribbean coast near the Costa Rican border by forces from Cuba. The scheme is being promoted by Ruben Miro, who was acquitted last year of complicity in the assassination of President Remon. Miro claims to have acquired a landing craft to carry some one hundred mercenaries from Cuba to Panama. The invasions would be timed to coincide with an uprising in Panama City scheduled for 15 April.

The scheme appears too involved to succeed in Panama, where opposition leaders seem habitually unable to coordinate their efforts and most plots become known to the authorities before they can reach fruition. A successful landing of "rebel" forces in mountainous western Panama, however, would pose a serious problem. The national guard, Panama's only armed force, would be unable to send more than a token force there without leaving the government dangerously exposed to opposition action in the capital.

Continued political agitation, largely stimulated by the chronic bitter rivalries within Panama's ruling oligarchy, expected to intensify over competition for a successor to ident de la Guardia, whose term ends next year. Such agrould spark serious violence among the restless masses in	is Pres- itation
major cities.	

## General Strike in Argentina Called for 3 April

In calling a general strike for 3 April, the Peronistas and Communists are renewing strong pressure on Argentine President Frondizi to lift the state of siege and take steps which would enable Peronistas to regain control of a large segment of organized labor. Publicly, however, the strike leaders are emphasizing that wages are inadequate in relation to the rapid price rises since the US-backed austerity plan was initiated on 1 January.

Because of widespread discontent over the almost 40-percent increase in living costs this year, the anti-Peronista labor group is meeting to decide whether it must join the strike to avoid losing support among labor. Consequently some Argentine press sources believe the strike could assume the proportions of the general strike in mid-January, which resulted in the government's taking control of ten major unions, including the main Peronista strongholds and the three national unions led by Communists.

The armed forces strongly support and the Communists. They will probable the police in controlling any disturbations.	ably be deployed to support
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<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>

#### THE PRESIDENT

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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